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I. INTRODUCTION
"Next in importance to freedom and justice is popular education, with-
out which neither freedom nor justice can be permanently maintained."'
-President James A. Garfield
The words uttered by President James A. Garfield are as true today as
they were when first spoken on July 12, 1881. Education is crucial to
maintaining the basic freedoms upon which the United States of America
is built. The United States Supreme Court has determined that "educa-
tion is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments." 2 Accordingly, the State of Texas has a constitutional duty to
provide for public education.' However, the Texas Constitution is ambig-
uous as to how the state shall provide, or more importantly, how to fund
public education.4 To accomplish this, the state has provided for public
education through a number of methods, but has relied heavily upon lo-
cally collected ad valorem property taxes.5
This current system for funding Texas public education has been con-
tinually attacked since the mid 1980's.6 These challenges were based on
alleged unconstitutionality of the public school funding program utilized
in Texas.7 On four separate occasions the Texas Supreme Court has held
1. The Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/2026.html (last visited
Feb. 2, 2007).
2. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (noting the importance of
education in this country).
3. See TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to
the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legisla-
ture of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance
of an efficient system of public free schools.").
4. See id.
5. See generally Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. (Neeley), 176
S.W.3d 746, 754 (Tex. 2005) (holding that the manner in which Texas funds its public edu-
cation violates Article VIII, Section 1-e of the Texas Constitution, which prohibits a state-
wide ad valorem property tax).
6. See id; see also Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d
717 (Tex. 1995) (affirming the constitutionality of the Texas public school finance system);
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. (Edgewood
III), 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992) (holding that the financing system was in violation of
Article VIII, Section 1-e of the Texas Constitution); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby
(Edgewood I1), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991) (violation of Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas
Constitution); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.
1989) (violation of Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution).
7. See Neeley, 176 S.W.3d 746; see also Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717; Edgewood III,
826 S.W.2d 489; Edgewood 11, 804 S.W.2d 491; Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391.
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that the public education financing scheme violates the Texas
Constitution. 8
In November of 2005, the Texas Supreme Court issued its ruling in the
most recent attack on the public education finance scheme.9 The Neeley
court was highly critical of the school finance system and ultimately de-
cided that the scheme amounted to an unconstitutional state-levied ad
valorem property tax.' ° The Neeley decision fulfilled the ominous predic-
tion found in the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Edgewood IV,
namely that the "local ad valorem taxes have become a state property tax
... as we warned ten years ago they inevitably would . . . ."" Such a
statewide ad valorem property tax is prohibited by the Texas Constitu-
tion. 12 This decision put the Texas Legislature in a difficult position be-
cause the Court established a June 1, 2006 deadline by which to solve the
funding crisis.' 3
Accordingly, Governor Rick Perry issued a proclamation on April 17,
2006, calling for a special session of the Legislature to address the school
funding crisis. 4 This proclamation asked the legislature "[t]o consider
legislation that provides for [1] school district property tax relief ... [2]
modification of the franchise tax... [3] modification of the motor vehicle
sales and use tax ... [and] [4] modification of the tax on tobacco prod-
ucts."'" The special legislative session provided some changes to certain
taxing schemes, mainly the modifications which the governor requested
in his proclamation. 16 Most of these changes concern increases of ciga-
8. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d 746; Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717; Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d
489; Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391.
9. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d 746.
10. Id. at 797 (criticizing the Texas public education finance system for being an un-
constitutional statewide ad valorem property tax).
11. Id. at 754 (realizing that an earlier prediction by the Texas Supreme Court -that
the manner in which the State finances public education will again become unconstitu-
tional-has been fulfilled).
12. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-e ("No State ad valorem taxes shall be levied upon any
property within this State.").
13. See Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 799 (establishing a June 1, 2006 deadline by which to
remedy the state constitutional problems with the Texas education finance mechanism).
14. Governor Rick Perry, Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas (April
17, 2006), available at http://www.governor.state.tx.us/divisions/press/proclomations/proclo-
mation.2006-04-17.
15. Id.
16. See Tex. H.B. 2, 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (2006) (changing allocation of certain sources of
tax revenue in an effort to alleviate school district property taxes and fund education); see
also Tex. H.B. 1, 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (2006); Tex. H.B. 3, 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (2006); Tex. H.B.
4, 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (2006); Tex. H.B. 5, 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (2006).
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rette taxes, modification of vehicle sales and use taxes, and increases of
franchise taxes.17
The Neeley ruling, the special legislative session, and upcoming elec-
tions have created a vacuum into which many groups and advocates have
proposed various solutions to the public education finance problem. This
combination forced the citizens of Texas to once again try to solve the
never-ending riddle that is public education finance. The multitude of
opinions, studies, and "solutions" are no doubt confusing to the populace,
and advocates for all sides will be trying to persuade the people that their
position is the best the State's future. For example, Governor Perry has
been successful in persuading the Legislature to change franchise taxes,
cigarette taxes, and vehicle sales and use taxes.18 However, most of these
proposed "solutions" to the funding crisis have drawbacks. It seems hyp-
ocritical that the government would tax cigarettes at a higher rate in or-
der to help fund children's education, while advocating strongly against
any, especially children's, consumption of cigarettes. Also, it seems
counterproductive to divert money from other government programs in
order to fund education. The available funding should be viewed as a
finite amount, a type of zero-sum game, and any additional amount
granted to one program results in an equal reduction in funding for an-
other. Utilizing a funding scheme such as this is analogous to removing a
plug from one leak, and placing it in another hole, only to have the previ-
ous hole drain the resources. This leaves additional taxation as the only
remedy, but it seems counterintuitive to declare that it is necessary to
educate our youth so that they may be productive and provide the labor
for Texas's economic future, yet impose inhibitive taxes on businesses and
citizens in order to fund that education. Even private citizens, with their
own religious and political agendas, have attempted to influence the fu-
ture of Texas public education through massive financial support of politi-
cal candidates.19
What must not be lost in all of the debate about how to fund public
education is the fact that over four million Texas schoolchildren are de-
pending on the citizens, through their elected representatives, to provide
for a sufficient, adequate, and constitutional education financing
scheme.2" School vouchers, a topic which has garnered much debate,
have been suggested as a means through which parents would be given a
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Voucher Obsession; Having Failed to Win Legislative Support for School
Vouchers, Millionaire Pitches Low-income Texans, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug. 16, 2006, at
B8.
20. See generally Texas Education Agency, Snapshot 2004: State Totals, http://www.
tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/snapshot/2004/state.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
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choice in deciding their children's education.21 School vouchers are not a
new concept, attracting national attention in 1955 with Nobel Prize win-
ning economist Milton Friedman's article entitled The Role of Govern-
ment in Education.22 Friedman advocates that the right of parents to
choose their children's schools stimulates free market competition, creat-
ing a more efficient school system. 23 Friedman also concludes that al-
lowing school choice serves to reduce the homogenization of schools,
thereby creating more diversity.24 Under Friedman's theories, the true
role of the government should "be limited to assuring that the schools
[meet] certain minimum standards ... 25 and continue in the traditional
role of funding and subsidizing public education. 26  Although school
vouchers in Milton Friedman's economics-based world may seem idealis-
tic, the utilization of school vouchers should be seriously considered in
the Texas education finance reform debate.
The purpose of this comment is to educate its readers about the feasi-
bility of school vouchers as a part of education reform in Texas. It is
undeniable that education is an issue which affects all socio-economic
classes. Part II focuses on three popular "solutions" to the education
funding quagmire, and how school vouchers should be a facet of an over-
all revision of the Texas public education financing scheme. Part III first
discusses the Texas legislative response to the most recent ruling on the
21. See generally Gary Scharrer, Education-The Elephant in the Room, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Sept. 3, 2006, at B1.
22. See generally History of School Choice - Alliance for School Choice, http://www.
allainceforschoolchoice.org/school choicehistory.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2007). "While
the school choice movement can trace its lineage to the very genesis of the United States
civil Society, the concept of parental choice in education began to more fully mature
through the work of Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman." Id.
23. See Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education 6 (Robert A. Solo
ed., Rutgers University Press 1955), available at http://www.freepublic.com/focus/f-news/11
73402/posts (detailing an economic perspective of education and parental choice).
If capital were as readily available for investment in human beings as for investment in
physical assets, whether through the market or through direct investment by the indi-
viduals concerned or their parents or benefactors, the rate of return on capital would
tend to be roughly equal in the two fields: if it were higher on non-human capital,
parents would have an incentive to buy such capital for their children instead of in-
vesting a corresponding sum in vocational training, and conversely. Id.
24. See id. (detailing an economic perspective of education and parental choice).
The adoption of such arrangements would make for more effective competition
among various types of schools and for a more efficient utilization of their resources.
It would eliminate the pressure of direct government assistance to private colleges and
universities and thus preserve their full independence and diversity at the same that it
enabled them to grow relatively to State institutions. Id.
25. Id.
26. See generally id.
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(un)constitutionality of public education finance by the Texas Supreme
Court. The next portion of Part III focuses on the typical Establishment
Clause challenges which arise from school voucher and parental choice
programs, and how the United States Supreme Court has ruled in recent
decisions concerning separation of church and state, as well as the Court's
decisions in cases involving family autonomy. The last portion of Part III
briefly discusses the role of personal choice and free-market capitalism in
American society. Part IV briefly evaluates some of the statistics and
data which indicate support for school voucher and parental choice pro-
grams. Lastly, Part V concludes this paper by reiterating that school
voucher and parental choice programs grant parents their rights of paren-
tal autonomy while maintaining a culturally diverse learning atmosphere
for their children.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Development of State Constitutional Challenges to Education
Finance Inequality
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court made a landmark decision
that held that education is not a fundamental right, and that classifica-
tions based upon wealth are not subject to strict scrutiny analysis.2 7 San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez established that any
governmental interference with education is subject to a rational basis
review, and such interference will be upheld when the contested state law
"rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest."28 Rodriguez
foreclosed most, if not all, Equal Protection challenges to the constitu-
tionality of school finance systems such as those used in Texas.
While Rodriguez was being decided, the New Jersey Supreme Court
heard a similar case, and ruled that the New Jersey public school system
violated the New Jersey state constitution. 9 This decision gave those
seeking to challenge public school finance programs a new avenue
through which to pursue their agenda.
27. See San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973) (ruling that
education is not a fundamental right and does not deserve the protection of strict scrutiny
analysis).
28. Id. (citing McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973)) (deciding that education
is not a fundamental right by announcing that "[t]he constitutional standard under the
Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged state action rationally furthers a legiti-
mate state purpose or interest").
29. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) (ruling that the New Jersey pub-
lic school system violated that state's constitution).
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Subsequently, those seeking to protest state school finance schemes
turned to state constitutional challenges.30 It appears that no state is im-
mune to such challenges.31 As of 1999, several state public school finance
programs have been found unconstitutional in some manner.32 Yet, dur-
ing that same time period, about the same number have been upheld.3 3
B. The Edgewood Cases and the Texas Legislative Response
Particularly in Texas, a set of cases has continually challenged the con-
stitutionality of the public school finance mechanism.34 The Edgewood
cases represent major attempts to overhaul the method that Texas utilizes
to finance public education.
1. Edgewood I
In 1987, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund
(MALDEF) represented Edgewood Independent School District (I.S.D.)
in Travis County District Court. Edgewood I.S.D. sought a declaration
by the court that the school finance scheme violated the Texas Constitu-
30. Alexandra Natapoff, 1993: The Year of Living Dangerously: State Courts Expand
the Right to Education, 92 EDuc. L. REP. 755, 760 (1994) (describing the most recently
used method of attacking public education finance programs).
31. See J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest
for Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607, 609 (1999) (noting that a majority of
the States have faced challenges to their public education funding methods and programs).
32. See id. at 609; see, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 CaI.(1976) (ruling that the
California public school financing system was invalid under the California equal protection
provisions); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (declaring that
the Kentucky school finance system was unconstitutional because State had not met its
state constitutional mandate to enact legislation providing for an efficient system of public
schools throughout the state); McDuffy v. Sec'y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 Mass. (1993)
(ruling that Massachusetts was not currently fulfilling its State constitutional duty to pro-
vide education in the public schools for children); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d
71 Wash. (1978) (holding that the use of special excess tax to fund education violated the
Washington state constitution).
33. See J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest
for Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607, 610 (1999); see, e.g., Shofstall v.
Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973) (ruling that the school financing system met the educa-
tional mandates of the Arizona Constitution); Exira Sch. Dist. v. Iowa, 512 N.W.2d 787
(Iowa 1994) (upholding the constitutionality of the Iowa public education financing mecha-
nism); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993) (upholding the constitutionality of the
Nebraska public education financing system); Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. Oklahoma, 746 P.2d
1135 (Okla. 1987) (ruling that the Oklahoma manner of financing public education did not
violate the State constitution).
34. See generally Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717 (affirming the constitutionality of the
Texas public school finance system); Edgewood 111, 826 S.W.2d 489; Edgewood 11, 804
S.W.2d 491; Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391.
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tion by failing to provide an efficient public school system." Following
appeals, the Texas Supreme Court ruled in a unanimous decision that the
public education finance system did violate the Texas Constitution be-
cause the legislature failed to "make suitable provision for the support
and maintenance of an efficient system of public free school."3 6 How-
ever, the Texas Supreme Court declined to give the legislature any gui-
dance as to how to provide for an efficient public school system.37 This
deference to the legislature, although seemingly proper from a separation
of powers standpoint, served to perpetuate the Texas school finance
crisis.
The Texas legislature responded to Edgewood I in a special legislative
session called in the Fall of 1989.3 ' Beginning in February of 1990, the
session lasted four months.39 The legislature was unable to devise a suita-
ble finance reform measure by the court-mandated May 1, 1990 dead-
line.4" After reaching a compromise which involved raising sales tax by
one-half cent, Governor Clements vetoed the bill, forcing the legislature
to scramble and attempt to reach another resolution.41 After further de-
bate, the Texas legislature enacted Senate Bill 1 in June 1990, with the
hope of creating "substantial" fiscal neutrality.42 Little did the legislature
know that another battle over public school finance was on the horizon.
2. Edgewood II
Less than a year and a half after passage of Senate Bill 1, the Texas
Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide another Edgewood I.S.D.
case.4 3  Upon direct appeal, the Texas Supreme Court decided in
Edgewood II that "Senate Bill 1 leaves essentially intact the same funding
35. See J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest
for Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607, 630 (1999) (describing the tactics
utilized in Edgewood 1).
36. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 393 (ruling that the Texas public education finance
system violated the State constitution).
37. See id. at 399 (declining to offer guidance to the Texas legislature as to solving the
education finance problem).
38. See J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest
for Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607, 638 (1999) (detailing the legislative
response to Edgewood I).
39. See id. at 646 n.207 (noting the length of the special session).
40. See id. at 646 (describing the failure of the legislature to meet the Texas Supreme
Court deadline).
41. See id. at 647 (detailing the chain of events in the aftermath of Edgewood I).
42. See id. at 649 (describing the legislative response to Governor Clement's veto).
43. See J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest
for Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607, 650 (1999) (noting that the Texas
Supreme Court did not have to wait too long before considering the question of the consti-
tutionality of Texas public education financing).
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system with the same deficiencies .... we reviewed in Edgewood 1. ' 44
The Texas Supreme Court further found that "[t]he fundamental flaw of
Senate Bill 1 lies not in any particular provisions but in its overall failure
to restructure the [school finance] system."45 The Supreme Court offered
some ideas for fixing the school finance system by suggesting consolida-
tion of school districts, the property tax base, or both.46 Ominously, the
court held that "[t]he [Texas] Constitution does not present a barrier to
the general concept of tax base consolidation, and nothing ... prevents
creation of school districts along county or other lines for the purpose of
collecting tax revenue and distributing it to other school districts within
their boundaries., 47 Once again, the Texas Legislature found itself with-
out a constitutional public school finance program.
In the wake of Edgewood II, there was a flurry of activity across the
state in an attempt to create a solution to the continuing problem of pub-
lic school finance.48 The issue again garnered intense political sentiment,
as the public and politicians debated the various interpretations of
Edgewood //.49 In fact, Lieutenant Governor Bill Hobby called for the
defeat of the Texas Supreme Court's nine justices in the next elections.5 °
Following Edgewood H, the Texas Legislature faced a difficult chal-
lenge because the Supreme Court rebuffed the legislative compromise
formed after Edgewood I, and had narrowed the legislature's options.51
The legislature responded with Senate Bill 351, which provided for a con-
solidation of school district taxing entities called County Education Dis-
tricts (CEDs).52 This allowed for several formerly independent school
districts to become a part of a taxing entity, which would in turn dis-
tribute tax revenues.53 The redistribution of tax revenue and the CEDs
would become the next battleground in the school finance reform court
44. See Edgewood 11, 804 S.W.2d at 495 (noting that the revised Texas public educa-
tion finance system was relatively unchanged from that found in Edgewood I).
45. See id. at 496 (describing the flaw with the Texas public education finance
program).
46. See id. at 497 (suggesting some ways the legislature could fix the education finance
system).
47. See id. at 497-98 (discussing possible methods the legislature could use to finance
public education) (emphasis added).
48. See J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest
for Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607, 654 (1999) (describing the aftermath
of Edgewwod II).
49. See id. (describing the political climate following Edgewood I).
50. Id.
51. See id. at 659 (describing the Texas Supreme Court response to Edgewood I).
52. See id. at 661 (describing the legislative response to Edgewood II).
53. See J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest
for Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 607, 661 (1999) (detailing some of the
solutions the legislature proposed following Edgewood II).
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challenges.54 In an odd turn of events, the next constitutional challenges
would not come from the financially deprived school districts; rather, the
challenge would be lodged by comparatively wealthy school districts.
3. Edgewood III
Merely two months after Senate Bill 351 became law, a group of some
of the wealthier school districts took issue with the bill." The plaintiffs in
Edgewood III argued that the CEDs in Senate Bill 351 were unconstitu-
tional because they amounted to a statewide ad valorem property tax,
without voter approval of such taxing authority, and the bill "constituted
a local or special law."5 6 At the District Court level, Senate Bill 351 was
found to be constitutional, and this ruling was quickly appealed.57 On
appellate review, the Texas Supreme Court again found that the measures
taken by the legislature violated the Texas Constitution in two regards.58
First, the Texas Supreme Court held that the CEDs created by Senate Bill
351 violated the Texas constitutional prohibition of a statewide ad
valorem property tax.59 Second, the court held that the legislatively-cre-
ated CEDs amounted to the imposition of a tax without an election.60
Again, the Texas Supreme Court deferred to the legislature, but the court
gave the legislature two tax cycles to prepare a solution to the still uncon-
stitutional education finance scheme in Texas.6 1
Following mesne legislative sessions, the Texas Legislature reacted to
the Texas Supreme Court's mandate with the enactment of Senate Bill
7.62 Senate Bill 7 was a piecemeal plan which allowed the wealthiest
school districts several options.63 Among these was consolidation by
54. See id. at 662 (foreshadowing the next challenge to education finance in Texas).
55. See id. (describing the challenges to the Texas public education finance system in
Edgewood III).
56. Id. at 662-63; see generally Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d 489; see also TEX. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1-e; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (denoting taxes for schools); TEX. CONST. art. III,
§ 56 (describing local and special laws); TEX. CONST. art. III, § 64 (describing the method
for consolidating governmental offices and functions).
57. J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for
Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607, 663-64 (1999).
58. See Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d 489.
59. See id. at 493 (ruling that CEDs amounted to an unconstitutional statewide ad
valorem property tax); see also TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-e.
60. See Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 493 (ruling that CEDs amounted to the imposi-
tion of a tax without an election); see also TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (denoting taxes for
schools).
61. See Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 522-23 (detailing the Texas Supreme Court's
ruling in Edgewood III).
62. J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for
Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607, 679 (1999).
63. Id.
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agreement, allowing other districts to annex commercial property for tax
purposes, purchase attendance credits, allow non-resident students to pay
tuition, or agree to establish small CEDs for tax purposes.64 A school
district would be subject to electing one of the aforementioned options if
its property value per student exceeded $280,000.65 Legislators finally
hoped the end of the school finance debate was over, but much to his
dismay the quiet was short-lived.
4. Edgewood IV
Not even two weeks passed when MALDEF and others asked a district
court to reconsider Senate Bill 7.66 The plaintiffs argued that Senate Bill
7 failed in three ways.67 The plaintiffs asserted that Senate Bill 7 pro-
vided "inadequate state funding, a $600 gap between rich and poor dis-
tricts at the maximum allowable rate of taxation, and the biennium lag in
determining the amount of state aid" was insufficient.68 Joining the
"poor school district" plaintiffs were wealthier school districts, who
lodged similar complaints as were filed in Edgewood III, mainly claiming
that 1) the taxation scheme in Senate Bill 7 was tantamount to a state-
wide ad valorem property tax, 2) use of tax revenue recapture was uncon-
stitutional, and 3) the reliance on property taxes was not "suitable" per
the Article VII, Section 1, of the Texas Constitution. 69 Additionally, a
third group of plaintiffs, comprised of students and parents, argued that
the current system denied the constitutional right to a "suitable and effi-
cient education., 70 This group also sought a voucher system and tuition
reimbursement to allow parents choice in regards to their children's
education.71
Unlike previous rulings, however, the district court held that Senate
Bill 7 was constitutional.72 Not surprisingly, the various groups appealed
the decision directly to the Texas Supreme Court,73 which affirmed the
decision and held that the public school finance scheme created by Senate
64. Id.
65. Id. at 683.
66. See id. at 686 (describing the ensuing challenge to Texas public education financ-
ing following Edgewood III).
67. J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for
Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607, 686 (1999).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 688.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for
Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607, 688-89 (1999).
73. See id. at 690 (explaining how an appeal to the Texas Supreme was highly
anticipated).
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Bill 7 passed constitutional muster.74 Justice Cornyn, writing for the ma-
jority, held that finance system established by Senate Bill 7 met the con-
stitutional requirement of efficiency, and that efficiency "does not require
equality of access to revenue at all levels."75 Edgewood IV also ruled that
the Senate Bill 7 financing scheme was not an abdication of the Legisla-
ture's "duty to make 'suitable provision[s]' for the public school sys-
tem,",76 and it also did not amount to a statewide ad valorem property
tax.77 Despite this victory for the Texas Legislature, Justice Cornyn fore-
warned that "[o]ur judgment in this case should not be interpreted as a
signal that the school finance crisis in Texas has ended., 78
C. The Neely Case and the Texas Legislative Response
The "calm" lasted approximately ten years before another major chal-
lenge to the Texas school finance scheme surfaced.79 As was the case in
Edgewood TV, the plaintiff-intervenors were comprised of various school
districts, both rich and poor.8 ° The rich school districts challenged the
state's education financing scheme on the theory that it amounted to a
state imposed property tax, which violates Article VII, Section 1-e of the
Texas Constitution.8 The poor school districts, as intervenors, asserted
that the financing system was inefficient "because children in property-
poor districts do not have substantially equal access to education reve-
nue.""2 The Neeley court evaluated the constitutionality of the Texas
school finance system in the context of the requirements established by
the previous court decisions concerning school finance.83 These require-
ments are that a public education system must be efficient,84 adequate,
74. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 725 ("We accordingly affirm the constitutionality
of the public school finance system enacted in Senate Bill 7.").
75. See id. at 729 (attempting to delineate some of the aspects of "efficiency" as it
pertains to the Texas constitutional requirement that the Legislature provide for an ef-
fiecient public education system).
76. See id. at 737 (addressing the "suitability" requirement of the constitutional duty
to provide for public education).
77. See id. at 738 (holding that the public education finance plan established by Senate
Bill 7 was not a statewide tax).
78. See id. at 725 (describing the concerns of the Texas Supreme Court regarding the
constitutional viability of the public education finance plan established by Senate Bill 7).
79. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d 746.
80. See id. at 751-52 (describing the diverse group of plaintiff-intervenors).
81. See id. at 751 (describing the arguments proposed by the wealthier school
districts).
82. See id. at 752 (describing the arguments proposed by the poorer school districts).
83. See generally id. (comparing the previous challenges to the Texas public education
finance system).
84. See Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 752 (enumerating the separate constitutional require-
ments for the provision of public education).
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and suitable.85 The Texas Supreme Court held that although the educa-
tion finance system complied with, at least for the time being, Article VII,
Section 1 of the Texas Constitution, it violated Article VII, Section 1-e's
prohibition of a statewide property tax.86 The court gave the Texas legis-
lature until June 1, 2006 to reconfigure the public education financing
scheme so that it complied with the Texas Constitution.
8 7
With the court's decision on November 22, 2005, the Legislature had
slightly more than 6 months to correct the infirmities of the Texas school
financing system. Consequently, Governor Rick Perry announced a spe-
cial session of the legislature on April 17, 2006.88 The legislature re-
sponded with House Bill 2, which provided changes to certain taxing
schemes, mainly the modifications which the governor requested in his
proclamation.89 Most of these alterations concerned increases of ciga-
rette taxes, modification of vehicle sales and use taxes, and increases of
franchise taxes.9 ° Not surprisingly, Governor Perry signed House Bill 2
into law on May 24, 2006.
The constitutionality of this reformation of the school finance system is
as yet unknown. However, it will undoubtedly be challenged as unconsti-
tutional by one or more of the 1,000 plus school districts in Texas. Be-
cause of this inevitability, it is time for the Texas legislature to institute an
overhaul of the entire public education finance system. As Justice Bris-
ter, writing the dissenting opinion in Neeley, points out, the majority
"does not go far enough.91 By failing to demand an 'efficient system' as
the Texas Constitution requires, or to demand standing and proof as
Texas law requires, this case once again focuses on short-term funding
rather than long-term solutions."92
85. Id. at 753.
86. See id. at 754 ("We now hold, as did the district court, that local ad valorem taxes
have become a state property tax in violation of [the Texas Constitution] .... [W]e con-
clude that those deficiencies [in the public education system] do not amount to a violation
of [the Texas Constitution]."); see also TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1-e.
87. See Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 800 (issuing an ultimatum for the Texas legislature to
correct the constitutional deficiencies of the public education finance system).
88. See Governor Rick Perry, Proclomation by the Governor of the State of Texas
(Apr. 17, 2006), available at http://www.governor.state.tx.us/divisions/press/proclomations/
proclomation.2006-04-17.
89. See Tex. H.B. 2, 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (2006) (changing the allocation of certain
sources of tax revenue in an effort to alleviate school district property taxes and fund
education).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 800.
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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. The Lack of Meaningful Direction from the Texas Supreme Court
and its Effect on Public Education Finance
A common element found in Edgewood I, Edgewood II, Edgewood III,
and Neeley is the Texas Supreme Court's reluctance to provide explicit
direction to the legislature when it comes to providing for a constitutional
public education finance system. 93 This lack of direction has only com-
pounded the debate, and has had an unknown and incalculable effect on
millions of children. Generally, judicial separation of powers arguments
are based upon the desire to prevent the judicial branch from invading
the province of the legislative or executive branches by exercising power
in areas for which it lacks such authority.94 One aspect of the underlying
logic for separation of powers with regard to the judiciary, is that the
judicial branch is not empowered to make policy.95 The stigma of a judi-
ciary making public policy is evidenced by the federal practice of ap-
pointing judges. Theoretically, this approach fuels a strict adherence to
separation of powers because these judges are not accountable to the
public through elections. However, Texas uses a system of elected judges,
93. See generally id. at 780-81 (opining that the judicial branch has the power to de-
termine whether the legislature has acted within its constitutional prescriptions; however,
the court refuses to offer guidance as to how to solve the education finance problem);
Edgewood 11, 826 S.W.2d at 523 ("The duty to establish and provide for such a [public
education finance] system is committed by the Constitution to the Legislature.");
Edgewood 11, 804 S.W.2d at 498 ("We do not prescribe the means which the Legislature
must employ in fulfilling its duty [to provide for an efficient public education finance sys-
tem] .... [However], our duty is plain: we must measure the public school finance system
by the standard of efficiency ordained by the people in our Constitution."); Edgewood I,
777 S.W.2d at 397 ("[T]he obligation [to provide for an efficient public education system] is
the legislature's .... ).
94. See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The powers of the Government of the State of Texas
shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a sepa-
rate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to one; those which are Execu-
tive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of
persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to
either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted."); see also Texas
Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993) ("One limit on
courts' jurisdiction under both the state and federal constitutions is the separation of pow-
ers doctrine.").
95. See Republican Party v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 747 (8th Cir. 2005) ("It is a common
notion that while the legislative and executive branches under our system of separated
powers make and enforce public policy, it is the unique role of the judicial branch to inter-
pret, and be quite apart from making that policy.").
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thus making them accountable to the public.9 6 After nearly a generation
of school children have had to suffer, it seems odd that an elected Texas
Supreme Court continues to be unwilling to offer any meaningful gui-
dance to the legislature on the creation of a sufficient, adequate, suitable,
and constitutional public education finance system. Texas Supreme
Court Justices are, after all, elected and beholden to the public, and insis-
tence on separation of powers as a justification for their failure to provide
direction to the legislature is weak.
In the absence of judicial direction, the legislature responded to Neeley
with House Bill 2 in May of 2006.9" As will be seen, this misguided legis-
lative reaction does not help solve the illusive goal of a sufficient, ade-
quate, and suitable public education financing system.
1. The Unguided Legislative Response: House Bill 2
Following Governor Perry's call for a special legislative session,98 the
Texas legislature convened in Austin. This session met for five weeks,
and on May 24, 2006, Governor Perry signed House Bill 2 into law. This
bill provided for the establishment of the Property Tax Relief Fund (here-
inafter the "Fund"), with the objective of
[r]eduction of the.., average school district maintenance and opera-
tions tax rate; and ... increasing the level of equalization of school
district enrichment tax effort to the extent that limits reliance by
school districts on local property tax effort and decreases the enrich-
ment tax rates of districts ... [and] not to increase the disparity in
revenue yield between districts of varying property wealth per
weighted student.99
The language used in the creation of the Fund appears to state the
legislature's intention of creating an efficient, adequate, and suitable pub-
lic education finance system. However, the three methods chosen to fi-
nance this Fund have weaknesses and are not a long term solution to the
school finance problem. After analyzing the school finance dilemma, the
only long term solutions appear to be levying a statewide education tax or
96. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 (c) ("Said Justices shall be elected (three of them each
two years) by the qualified voters of the state at a general election; shall hold their offices
six years; and shall each receive such compensation as shall be provided by law.").
97. See generally Tex. H.B. 2, 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (2006) (changing the allocation of
certain sources of tax revenue in an effort to alleviate school district property taxes and
fund education).
98. Governor Rick Perry, Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas (Apr.
17, 2006), available at http://www/governor.state.tx.us/divisions/press/proclamations/procla-
mation.2006-04-17.
99. See TEX. GoV'T CODE ANN. § 403.109 (Vernon 2006) (establishing the Property
Tax Relief Fund).
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increasing the sales tax rate, both of which will require a constitutional
amendment.
House Bill 2 first states that the Fund is to be subsidized through
changes in the disposition of revenue from the state franchise tax.100 The
new franchise tax is designed to serve as a subsidy to the Fund, whereas
its previous use was restricted to providing for the general fund.' 0 ' The
estimated franchise taxes for the 2006-07 biennial are $3.788 billion.' 0 2 If
the fund requires supplementation from the franchise tax, other funding
must be collected to replace any amount that may be withdrawn, thereby
necessitating additional taxation. If this additional taxation is to come
from taxes on business, the effect on economic development may be dis-
astrous. One of the major reasons for public education is to provide an
attractive labor force for such economic development. It would be un-
wise to discourage establishment of the businesses which would employ
the educated workforce the state is attempting to supply through taxation
of such businesses.
The second manner in which the Fund is to be maintained is through
the use of tax revenue generated from sale, rental, and use of motor vehi-
cles. 10 3 Previously, twenty-five percent of this tax money was allocated to
public education, with the remainder going to the general fund.'0 4 The
estimated sale, rental, and motor vehicle tax for the 2006-07 biennial is
$5.726 billion.10 5 Following the amendments added by House Bill 2, the
State Comptroller must deposit all of the monies collected under the sale,
rental, and use of motor vehicles to the Fund.10 6 The same quandary
exists because revenue that was previously designated for use by other
programs requires a substitute source of funding. The only solutions are
to either raise taxes or cut back on other programs. Absent the creation
of a statewide education tax or an increase in the sales tax rate, the diver-
sion of tax revenue from the sales, rental, and use of motor vehicles is not
a viable long-term resolution of the public school finance problem.
100. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.4011 (Vernon 2006) (allocating certain revenue
from the franchise tax to the Property Tax Relief Fund).
101. See generally TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.401 (Vernon 2006) (detailing the previ-
ous allocation of funds generated by the franchise tax).
102. See Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Available Revenue, http://www.cpa.
state.tx.us/taxbud/bre2006/available.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2007) (denoting the division
of tax revenues available to the State).
103. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 152.1222 (Vernon 2006) (allocating certain revenue
from the sale, rental, and use of motor vehicles taxes to the Property Tax Relief Fund).
104. See id. (detailing the previous allocation of funds generated by the sale, rental,
and use of motor vehicles taxes).
105. Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Available Revenue, http://www.cpa.state.
tx.us/taxbud/bre2006/available.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
106. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 152.1222 (Vernon 2006).
[Vol. 9:497
SCHOOL VOUCHERS
The final manner in which House Bill 2 attempts to decipher the school
finance riddle is through appropriation of all proceeds from cigarettes
1°7
as well as revenue from taxes on tobacco products and cigars.10 8 The
estimated cigarette and tobacco tax for the 2006-07 biennium is $1.044
billion.' 09 The amendments allow for allocation of every dollar in ciga-
rette and tobacco tax generated through these sections of the tax code." 0
The problem of replacing this lost revenue remains. Undoubtedly, this
tax revenue is used for other government programs, and any reduction
will require additional taxation or abbreviation of State-funded programs.
Additionally, tobacco taxation appears to be hypocritical when the State
actively discourages tobacco use among children, yet it desires to fund
children's education through the taxation of tobacco.
It is apparent that the proposed solutions to school funding inade-
quately address the constantly increasing challenges facing the strains the
public education financing system. Fundamental changes are needed, in-
cluding some type of statewide education tax or an increase in the sales
tax. There are two components of the education finance dilemma. So
far, the Legislature has attempted to manipulate the first of these facets:
the financing and funding of education. Nonetheless, the second aspect
requires attention. This second facet is the type of education options
given to the taxpayers who pay for the system and whose children are
supposed to be given the benefit of a constitutionally mandated
education."'
In 1994, a group of parent-plaintiffs urged the Legislature to seriously
consider the feasibility of a parental choice or school voucher program in
Texas. 12 Such a program would allow parents to make a meaningful
choice in one of the most important functions a state government should
provide for its citizens: education.
107. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 154.6035 (Vernon 2006) (allocating certain revenue
from cigarette taxes to the Property Tax Relief Fund) (emphasis added).
108. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 155.2415 (Vernon 2006) (allocating certain revenue
from tobacco taxes to the Property Tax Relief Fund).
109. See Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, Available Revenue, http://www.cpa.
state.tx.us/taxbudlbre2006/available.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) (denoting the division
of sources of tax revenues available to the State).
110. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 154.6035 (Vernon 2006); TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 155.2415 (Vernon 2006).
111. See generally TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
112. See J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest
for Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607, 688 (1999) (describing the argument
of certain groups in support of school vouchers during Edgewood IV).
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B. The Constitutionality of School Choice
Generally, parental choice and school voucher systems are criticized as
unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. 1 3 The Supreme
Court has articulated three tests to be used when deciding whether an
action by the government exceeds the limits of separation of church and
state." 4 A school voucher or parental choice program can easily be tai-
lored to withstand such constitutional challenges.
Another constitutional implication that arises from parental choice and
school voucher programs is the fundamental right of family autonomy,
and the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children." 5 A
program involving school choice strengthens this fundamental right.
[T]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to stand-
ardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for his additional
obligations." 6
Lastly, the United States is a country built upon freedom of choice.
Our capitalist economy is based upon choice. Not surprisingly, the
United States Supreme Court desires to further this "culture of choice,"
especially when it comes to fundamental rights and significant liberty in-
terests. A key factor in many United States Supreme Court decisions
113. See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (Zelman), 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding
that the State of Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause of the United States Constitution).
114. See Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon), 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("Three such tests
may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits relig-
ion [; and] finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."').
115. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville (Troxel), 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding that a Washing-
ton State law which afforded rights to grandparent unconstitutionally violated a parent's
fundamental right to control the raising of their children); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder
(Yoder), 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that parents have a constitutionally protected right to
exempt their children from a mandatory school attendance law when such compulsory at-
tendance conflicts with established religious beliefs); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters (Pierce), 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that an Oregon state law requiring children to attend public
schools was an unconstitutional violation of a parent's right to make decisions concerning
the upbringing of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska (Meyer), 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding
that a Nebraska law which prohibited teaching in any language other than English was an
unconstitutional violation of a parent's right to make decisions concerning the upbringing
of their children).
116. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
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appears to be a desire to leave the ultimate decision concerning funda-
mental rights and significant liberty interests to the individual." 7
1. Establishment Clause Challenges
The lofty eminence of separation of church and state is evident in the
first sentence of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
.... 118 Clearly the public, through its elected representatives in Con-
gress, viewed this theory of separation with marked importance." 9 Sur-
prisingly, the Establishment Clause has only recently been incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment as applying to the states. 2°
In order to strike an appropriate balance, the United States Supreme
Court has articulated a test (Lemon test) to be used when determining
whether a government program violates the Establishment Clause.1 2'
Lemon involved a Pennsylvania statute which provided financial support
to non-public schools for the teaching of certain secular subjects, and a
Rhode Island statute which paid a direct subsidy to teachers in non-public
schools. 122 The United States Supreme Court held that both statutes
were unconstitutional. 123 The court stated that the Establishment Clause
was designed to prevent "sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
volvement of the sovereign in religious activity., 124 The Lemon test is
comprised of three parts.' 25 First, the state "statute must have a secular
legislative purpose ....2 Second, the statute's "primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... 127 Lastly, "the stat-
117. See Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (holding that a parent decides whether to spend gov-
ernment-funded tuition subsidy at public, private, sectarian or secular school); see also
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (finding that a woman has a
right to choose whether to have an abortion before the viability of the fetus).
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion .... ) (emphasis added).
119. See generally Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REv.
1709, 1711 (2000) (describing the early attitudes about the intermingling of religion and
government which influenced the drafters of the Constitution).
120. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating the First Amend-
ment prohibition against governmental establishment of religion as being applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment).
121. See Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (ruling that certain state government aid to sectarian
schools violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment).
122. See id. at 606-10 (describing the two state laws challenged in Lemon).
123. Id. at 607.
124. Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
125. Id. at 612-13 (describing the three-part Lemon test).
126. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (describing the first part of the Lemon test).
127. Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
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ute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.' "128
This seemingly simple three-part test was utilized until 1997, when the
United States Supreme Court decided the case of Agostini v. Felton.'29
Agostini "folded the entanglement inquiry into the primary effect in-
quiry., 1 30 Although Agostini-is not a drastic departure from prior Estab-
lishment Clause analysis, a key feature of the case arises with the United
States Supreme Court's analysis of whether programs have the prohibited
effect of advancing religion. It is clear that the United States Supreme
Court has "drawn a consistent distinction between government programs
that provide aid directly to religious schools, and programs of true private
choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a result
of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals.'131 Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court has indicated that a parental choice or school
voucher system which does not directly fund sectarian schools, but vests
the choice with the parent will most likely comply with the Establishment
Clause.
2. Family Autonomy as a Fundamental Right
The argument in favor of parental choice or a school voucher program
is further bolstered by the fact that such a system would advance the fun-
damental right of family autonomy, specifically the right of parents to
control the raising of their children. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the United
States Supreme Court established family autonomy as a fundamental
right when it described the basic aspects of liberty:
[W]ithout doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to en-
joy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.' 32
128. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
129. See generally Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (holding that a federally
supported program that provided school instruction to disadvantaged schoolchildren on a
neutral basis complied with the Establishment Clause when such a program contained cer-
tain safeguards against the intermingling of religion and government).
130. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[W]e [in Agostini]
folded the entanglement inquiry into the primary effect inquiry.").
131. See id. at 649 (2002) (citations omitted) (noting a distinction between different
types of government aid to religion) (emphasis added).
132. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (establishing family autonomy as a fundamental right
protected by the Constitution) (emphasis added).
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Meyer was the first case to establish that such a fundamental right was
protected from improper state infringement through application of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.133 Meyer ruled that
a Nebraska law forbidding teachers from instructing certain students in
any language other than English was an unconstitutional impediment of a
parent's fundamental right to control the rearing of their children. 134 Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court endorsed a parent's right to decide how
their child shall be educated.
The next case affirming parental autonomy as a fundamental right was
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, decided in 1925.'35 Pierce decided that an Or-
egon state law requiring attendance at public schools for essentially all
children between the age of eight and sixteen "unreasonably interfere[d]
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control"'136 Again, the Supreme Court
advanced the right of parental autonomy in the context of education.
After a lull of nearly a half-century, the Supreme Court decided a case
which entailed a hybrid of both the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment' 37 and the right of parents to control the upbringing of their
children. 3 ' Wisconsin v. Yoder involved a state law mandating school
attendance for children until they reached the age of sixteen.139 The
United States Supreme Court described the position of education in our
society and how government interest in providing such education must
conform to the United States Constitution and its protections of individ-
ual liberties, noting that:
133. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. Id.
134. See Meyer, 262 U.S. 390 (holding that a Nebraska law which prohibited teaching
in any language other than English was an unconstitutional violation of a parent's right to
make decisions concerning the upbringing of their children).
135. See Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (holding that an Oregon state law requiring children to
attend public schools was an unconstitutional violation of a parent's right to make deci-
sions concerning the upbringing of their children).
136. Id. at 534-35 (emphasis added).
137. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ") (emphasis added).
138. See Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (holding that parents have a constitutionally protected
right to exempt their children from a mandatory school attendance law when such compul-
sory attendance conflicts with established religious beliefs).
139. Id. at 207 (describing the Wisconsin statute in question).
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[A] state's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it,
is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fun-
damental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the tradi-
tional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of
their children ....140
The Supreme Court went further and drove the last proverbial nail into
the coffin by reiterating that "[t]he history and culture of Western civili-
zation reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and
upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the up-
bringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition.', 141 Once more, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the rights of parents to control the upbringing of their children as
well as the right to practice one's religion without government restraint.
More recently, the United States Supreme Court considered the issue
of state infringement upon the fundamental right of a parent to control
the rearing of their children in Troxel v. Granville.142 Troxel involved a
Washington law which afforded anyone the right to petition the state for
child visitation rights.'43 The Court held that the statute violated the
United States Constitution by infringing upon "the interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children - [which] is perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court."'"
Troxel commented on the long tradition of recognizing the fundamental
140. See id. at 214 (describing the interplay between a State's interest in providing
education and the constitutional protections of individual liberties) (alteration in original).
141. See id. at 232 (opining about the long tradition and establishment of the funda-
mental right of parents to control the rearing of their children) (emphasis added) (altera-
tion in original).
142. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75.
143. Id. at 60 (describing the Washington statute in question) (emphasis added).
144. See id. at 65 (illustrating that the fundamental right to control the raising of one's
children is entrenched in American jurisprudence) (alteration in original); see also Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (stating that the Due Process Clause pro-
tects the right of parents to control the upbringing and education of their children);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child[ren] does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to
the State.") (alteration in original); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (describing the
Supreme Court's consistency in applying the established concept that parents have control
over their children's upbringing); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (recognizing
that the parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232
("The primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established
beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972) (announcing that the right of a parent to control the management of their children
carries a presumption that must be accorded deference).
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right to control the rearing of one's children.145 In particular, the United
States Supreme Court mentioned that "the 'liberty' specially protected by
the Due Process Clause includes the right ... to direct the education and
upbringing of one's children."' 46 The Supreme Court also reemphasized
that there is no doubt "that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." '147 For the
United States Supreme Court to deny a grandparent an opportunity to
seek visitation of their own grandchild clearly demonstrates the para-
mount importance given to the fundamental right to control the raising
and upbringing of one's children.
C. The Role of Personal Choice in American Society
The United States of America is a country based on free choice of the
individual. Three of the biggest tenets of a society are government, relig-
ion, and economics. In the United States, all three of these tenets are
rooted in choice of the individual as evidenced throughout the United
States Constitution. 48 The Constitution provides for popular election of
representatives, 49 protection of contractual rights and abilities of individ-
uals,'1 50 election of the leader of the country,15 1 use of ratification by the
people of amendments to the Constitution,' 52 individual religious and po-
145. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (providing a timeline of U.S. Supreme Court cases
dating back over 75 years dealing with a parent's right to the care of their children).
146. Id. at 66 (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400) (describing the
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause) (emphasis added).
147. See id. (stressing that parents have a fundamental right to control the raising of
their children is undoubtedly an entrenched facet of American jurisprudence).
148. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall
be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States
.... "); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (protecting existing contract rights from government
interference); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (concerning the election of the President); U.S.
CONST. art. V (describing the utilization of a popular vote to amend the Constitution); U.S.
CONST. amend. I (granting religious and political freedom to the people); U.S. CoNsT.
amend. V (affording the people due process of law); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (granting
right to vote to all citizens); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (detailing process of electing
Senators).
149. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing for bi-annual elections of the House of
Representatives).
150. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (explaining that the state cannot impede peo-
ple's contract rights).
151. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (concerning the election of the President).
152. See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing the utilization of Congress and the State Leg-
islatures to amend the Constitution).
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litical freedom,153 due process of law,154 the right to vote, 55 and the elec-
tion of Senators. 156  The United States Constitution and its drafters
clearly desired to protect individual liberties and freedoms through the
advancement of free individual choice. In fact, the development of capi-
talism in this country was furthered by the United States Constitution. 57
Given the fact that the basis for this country's government and political
structure centered around personal choice, it should not be shocking to
discover that this country's economic system of capitalism is also gov-
erned by free choice. The economic outputs of a society are determined
by producers and consumers, and their choices. Producers have the lib-
erty to decide how much land, labor, and capital will be utilized for pro-
duction. 158 Consumers are free to decide what goods and services to
purchase, considering factors such as tastes preferences, market size, in-
come, and consumer expectations. 159 It should not be surprising that ed-
ucation can also be subject to such economic considerations.
Demand is defined as "the amount of a resource, good, or service that
people are willing and able to buy at a series of prices in a given period of
time."' 160 Because of the slew of cases involving challenges for better ed-
ucation,' 6 ' it is overtly evident that the public is more than willing to
"purchase" better education. In fact, Supreme Court Justice Clarence
Thomas has written that "many blacks and other minorities now support
school choice programs because they provide the greatest educational op-
portunities for their children in struggling communities.' 162
Having satisfied that requirement for demand, it is the ability to
purchase such education services that must be realized. If the govern-
153. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (granting religious and political freedom to the
people).
154. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (affording the people due process of law).
155. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (granting right to vote to all citizens).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
157. See generally Forrest McDonald, The Constitution and Hamiltonian Capitalism,
in How CAPITALISTIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 57 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A.
Schambra eds., 1982) (describing the connection between the United States Constitution
and the furtherance of capitalism).
158. DAVID E. O'CONNOR & CHRISTOPHER FAILLE, BASIC ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES: A
GUIDE FOR STUDENTS 63-68 (Greenwood Press 2000) (explaining the factors of
production).
159. Id. at 34-36 (explaining the factors which affect consumer demand).
160. Id. at 31 (emphasis added) (defining demand).
161. See Neeley, 176 S.W.3d 746; see also Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d 717; Edgewood
III, 826 S.W.2d 489; Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d 491; Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d 391 (illustrat-
ing violation of Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution).
162. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 682 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the sentiment of
minority parents concerning school choice).
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ment provided a subsidy, also known as a transfer payment,163 to those
with lower income, then a larger group of people would be able to decide
how and where to educate their children. With this increase in the de-
mand for provision of better education, an increase in supply of educa-
tion providers would ensue. Once the demand has been met by an
adequate supply, suppliers would be in competition with each other.
Such competition ensures that an efficient market will emerge 164 forcing
education providers to supply quality education, which will in turn create
a better future for society. If these education providers fail to provide
adequate services, then parents, as consumers, would seek better service
from others. In the long-run, these inefficient providers of inferior educa-
tion services would be driven out of the market. Clearly, where there is a
demand for better education, a capitalist society such as ours should not
shy away from meeting that demand by allowing individuals the option of
choosing how their children should be educated.
These concepts first drew widespread attention when the Nobel Prize
Laureate Milton Friedman advocated this economic approach to educa-
tion.165 In 1955, Friedman posited that if parents are given the opportu-
nity to obtain a subsidy to send their child to the school of their own
choosing, there would be efficiency in the education industry, much the
same as in private industry.166 This economics-based approach to school
choice has its merits and it comports with the traditional concept of free
individual choice that the United States embraces.
Additionally, the incorporation of the idea of individual choice is not
foreign to the United States Supreme Court, as evidenced by its decisions
in cases such as Lawrence v. Texas and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.167
In one of its more controversial and publicized decisions, the importance
of individual choice was reinforced when the United States Supreme
163. See DAVID E. O'CONNOR & CHRISTOPHER FAILLE, BASIC ECONOMIC PRINCI-
PLES: A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS 176 (Greenwood Press 2000) (defining transfer payments as
"payments of money, goods, or services, financed by one group of citizens and distributed
to another group of citizens").
164. See generally id. at 45 (describing Milton Friedman and Adam Smith's ideas con-
cerning free markets and the advantages of efficiency that develop from such markets).
165. See generally Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education (Robert A.
Solo ed., Rutgers University Press 1955), available at http://www.freepublic.com/focus/f-
news/1173402/posts (outlining an economic perspective of education and parental choice).
166. See id. (detailing an economic perspective of education and parental choice).
167. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas (Lawrence), 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (stipulating that
"our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education");
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000) (reaffirming an individual's "right to
[choose to] associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic,
educational, RELIGIOUS, and cultural" reasons).
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Court ruled that "the right of personal privacy includes the abortion deci-
sion,... [and] that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough
to cover the abortion decision ....168 The discussion of cases where the
United States Supreme Court has emphasized and reaffirmed the various
liberties which entail individual choice is beyond the scope of this com-
ment. However, it should be abundantly clear that the United States
Constitution supports individual choice, both through its explicit man-
dates and its interpretation by the courts.
The combination of the fundamental right to privacy, including the
ability to control the upbringing of one's children,1 69 the spirit of free
choice by the individual, and the important role that education plays in
maintaining the numerous liberties United States citizens enjoy, establish
the necessity for serious consideration of parental choice and school
voucher programs as a facet of public education systems.
It can be effectively argued that a state legislature which has essentially
denied parents, particularly those with lower incomes, of their well-estab-
lished constitutional right to control the upbringing of their children, has
violated the constitutional protection of such a right. Accordingly, the
Texas Legislature, by failing to provide a sufficient, efficient and suitable
public education, which denies parents any meaningful choice in the up-
bringing of their children, has not only violated the Texas Constitution,17 °
but also the United States Constitution. 171 Quite possibly, the federal
constitutional challenges to state public education financing deficiencies,
presumably foreclosed by Rodriguez, may have new life. Nonetheless,
Texas should begin to seriously consider the merits of parental choice of
schools in order to avoid such federal constitutional challenges and to
comply with its constitutionally imposed mandate to provide for a suita-
ble, adequate and efficient system of public schools.
IV. THE SUPPORT FOR PARENTAL CHOICE AND SCHOOL VOUCHERS
Notwithstanding the advancement of the fundamental right of parents
to control the upbringing of their children and the idea of free individual
choice, other benefits are found in the use of school vouchers and paren-
tal choice.
168. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973) (finding that a woman has a right
to privacy, which, under certain circumstances, includes the right to an abortion).
169. See generally Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.
170. See generally TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (mandating that the Texas Legislature has
the duty "to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an
efficient system of public free schools").
171. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting the State from depriving
"any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law .... ).
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A. Parental Choice Benefits Economically Disadvantaged Students, as
well as Society at Large
First, school choice would allow parents more options and a meaningful
decision in their children's education. Enabling children to attend other
public schools, or private schools, both secular and sectarian, would sat-
isfy a demand by the public for better educational options. Given the
strong correlation between economically disadvantaged students and low
educational achievement in Texas, this economically disadvantaged group
stands to benefit the most from school vouchers and parental choice.
172
Economically disadvantaged students constitute over fifty-five percent of
Texas public school children.173 Seeing that this class of students com-
prises a majority of Texas public school children, school vouchers will
have an impact on many Texas school children. Aristotle once said that
"[p]overty is the parent of revolution and crime.' 174 Since education is
commonly believed to be the best means to raise people from poverty, it
should be an easy decision that the state should do everything within its
power to educate all children, especially those who are economically dis-
advantaged or impoverished. If the state can educate a child, then the
likelihood of that child becoming involved in crime diminishes.
If the common sense behind this approach is insufficient to persuade
opponents to school vouchers and parental choice, a comparison of the
costs of educating a child versus incarcerating an adult may be more per-
suasive. In the 2004-05 school year, it cost the State of Texas $9,269 to
educate one child.' 75 Assuming a child is educated for thirteen years in
the Texas public school system,176 the total cost to educate that child is
172. See generally Texas Education Agency, TAKS, Statewide Performance Results,
http://www.tea.state.tx.us/student.assessment/reporting/results/swresults/taks/2006/allg-
rades_06.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2007) (detailing the passage results for various
demographics of the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills test). See also Texas Edu-
cation Agency, Snapshot 2004: Item Definitions, http://www.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/
snapshot/2004/itemdef.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2007) ("Economically disadvantaged stu-
dents are those who are reported as eligible for free or reduced-price meals under the
National School Lunch and Child Nutrition Program, or other public assistance.").
173. See Texas Education Agency, Economically Disadvantaged Status Reports, http:
//www.tea.state.tx.us/cgi/sas/broker?-service=marykay&-program=adhoc.addispatch.sas&
major=st&minor=c&endyear=06&format=W&linespg=60&charsln=120&selsumm=ss&
key=TYPE+HERE (last visited Feb. 4, 2007) (detailing the proportion of Texas public
school students considered economically disadvantaged).
174. See The Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/28911.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2007).
175. Texas Education Agency, Actual Financial Data, http://www.tea.state.tx.us/tea/
actfinmultiyear.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2007) (displaying the total expenditures per child
for various school years).
176. It takes thirteen years for a child to complete Kindergarten through twelfth
grade.
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$120,497.'7 The benefit to society will be that child's increased produc-
tivity and opportunity because he obtained an education. On the oppo-
site extreme, if the child does not get a quality education, and lives in
poverty, his likelihood of being involved in crime increases. During fiscal
year 2005, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice oversaw the incar-
ceration of 658,382 inmates, 178 and spent $1,922,650,560 to care for these
inmates.179 This gives an average cost of $2,920 per inmate for fiscal year
2005.180 The average sentence length for a Texas inmate was 19.6 years
during this time period. 181 In total, for the incarceration of the average
inmate, the state of Texas spends $57,232.182 Although the cost of incar-
cerating the average inmate is slightly less than half of the cost to educate
a child, there are many intangible social costs which are not considered.
A hypothetical would be beneficial to explain the true picture.
Suppose that on the same day, a student begins kindergarten in a Texas
public school and a felon begins a 19.6 year sentence in a Texas prison.
After thirteen years, it will have cost the State of Texas $120,497 to edu-
cate the student. It would have cost the State $37,960 to incarcerate the
inmate. However, the State has to pay for over six years' of incarceration
for the inmate, whereas the student, assuming he enters the workforce
after graduating high school, begins earning income. At the end of 19.6
years, it will have cost Texas $57,232 to incarcerate the inmate. However,
assuming the student earns the per capita income in Texas of $30,732,183
the net benefit of educating the student becomes $82,334.184 Although
177. This amount is calculated by multiplying the average annual expenditure amount
of $9,269 by thirteen.
178. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2005 OPERATING
BUDGET 1, available at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/publications/executive/FY2005_Statisti-
calReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2007) (giving an overview of the Texas prison system
during Fiscal Year 2005).
179. See id. (detailing the operating budget for the Texas prison system during Fiscal
Year 2005).
180. This amount is calculated by dividing the total cost of incarceration by the num-
ber of inmates incarcerated.
181. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2005 OPERATING
BUDGET 1, available at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/publications/executive/FY2005_Statisti-
calReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
182. This amount is calculated by multiplying the average number of years of an in-
mate's sentence times the average cost per year to incarcerate.
183. See Bureau of Economic Analysis, United States Per Capita Income 2004, http://
bea.gov/bea/regional/reis/scb.cfm (last visited Feb. 5, 2007) (Follow these additional steps
to obtain Texas' per capita income: 1) Under "Step 1. Select a Table," select "CA 1-3"; 2)
Under "Step 2," select "3.0 Per capita personal income," then "Texas," then "2004," then
"Display").
184. This amount is calculated by subtracting the total derived from multiplying the
years that the student works while the inmate remains incarcerated (6.6) times the per
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there are other considerations unaccounted for, it should be clear that the
net economic benefit of educating a child far outweighs the costs associ-
ated with incarceration which is more likely to occur if that child is not
educated.
B. Parental Choice Benefits Minorities
Another group which stands to benefit from school vouchers and pa-
rental choice are the minorities which comprise a majority of the econom-
ically disadvantaged students in Texas. Currently, twenty-three percent
of Texas' African-Americans, twenty-six percent of Texas' Hispanics, and
twelve percent of Texas' Asians are in poverty. 185 One author has written
that "the appeal of private schools is especially strong among parents who
are low in income, minority, and live in low-performing districts: precisely
the parents who are the most disadvantaged under the current system [of
public education]." '186 In fact, when parents of public school children
were asked whether they support or oppose school vouchers, the results
were overwhelming. 87 The survey divided the respondents into several
subgroups based upon income, education, ethnic background, quality of
their current school district, political party identification, religion, per-
formance of their current school district, and desire to send their children
to private schools.188 According to the survey results, all but one sub-
group (those with postgraduate education degrees, which still responded
forty-nine percent in favor) of parents of public school children sup-
ported some form of school vouchers. 89 This unambiguously shows that
most parents, regardless of race, religion, and educational background,
approve of some form of parental choice or school voucher program.
This conforms to this country's attitude towards the autonomy of the indi-
vidual, especially in the arena of controlling the raising and upbringing of
one's children.
capita income in Texas for 2004 from the total cost to educate the student for thirteen
years, leaving a net benefit in dollar amount.
185. CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY PRIORITIES, TEXAS POVERTY 101, http://www.cppp.
org/files/8/BRP%20povertyl0lSep%2006.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2007) (relating the re-
sults of the United States Census Bureau's Current Population Survey 2005 to 2006
Supplements).
186. TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 164,
(Brookings Institution Press 2001) (relating the views of various groups of parents on
school choice issues).
187. See id. at 214 tbl.7-3 (detailing the results of surveys concerning the views of
various groups of parents on school choice issues).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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C. Parental Choice Furthers Diversity in Education
A common argument against the use of school vouchers is that al-
lowing parents to decide where to send their children will create less di-
verse, homogenous schools.1 9° The Supreme Court has made it
abundantly clear that diversity in education is important.' 91 A new wave
of segregation in schools would obviously have a negative impact on our
children, and would be contrary to the wisdom espoused by the Supreme
Court. However, there are scientifically sound studies which indicate that
schools participating in voucher and parental choice programs are less
segregated than their public school counterparts. 192 In fact, the Forster
study indicates that the private schools which participate in the Cleveland
school choice program are eighteen percentage "points less segregated
than Cleveland public schools[,]" while those schools in the Milwaukee
school choice program are thirteen "points less segregated than Milwau-
kee public schools." '9 3 The higher levels of integration provide a rich and
diverse learning environment for our children.
Due to the fact that school choice would help the impoverished seg-
ment of our society, there is a high level of support for parental choice
and school vouchers, and indications that schools involved with voucher
systems are more integrated and diverse, it will not be surprising to see
the people begin to speak through their elected representatives. Parental
choice and school vouchers should be seriously considered as a facet of
an efficient, adequate, and sufficient Texas public education system.
190. See Casey Lartigue, Fly-by-Night Public Schools, The Cato Institute (May 24,
2002), available at http://www.cato.org/dailys/05-24-02.html (enumerating certain argu-
ments in opposition to school voucher programs); see also Zina Vishnevsky, Education
Needed to Thrive; Urban League President Says, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, OH), Mar. 16,
2002, at B4 (relating the thoughts of the President of the Urban League on the issue of
equality).
191. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger (Grutter), 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) ("The diffusion
of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher education must be ac-
cessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.") (emphasis added); Gratz v. Bol-
linger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (holding that an undergraduate university department's
admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause it was not narrowly tailored to meet the compelling government interest of educa-
tional diversity).
192. See Greg Forster, Freedom from Racial Barriers: The Empirical Evidence on
Vouchers and Segregation, School Choice Issues in Depth, Oct. 2006, available at http://
www.friedmanfoundation.org/segregation.pdf (detailing the results of a scientific study
which shows that school vouchers programs provide for more integrated schools).
193. National Center for Policy Analysis, Voucher Programs Less Segregated then
Public Schools, http://www.ncpa.org/sub/dpd/index.php?page=Article&ArticleID=12330
(last visited Feb. 4, 2007) (summarizing the results of a recent study on integration and
segregation levels between schools that participate in voucher programs and their public
school counterparts).
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V. CONCLUSION
Given the long history of crisis concerning the manner in which Texas
attempts to provide and fund public education, it appears that new ideas
about education are needed. The time may be right for Texas politicians
and leaders to consider school vouchers or some sort of parental choice
program as a complimentary part of public education. The concept of
school vouchers is not of recent vintage,194 and has become quite popular
in the last few years.195 Additionally, it has become easy to survive some
of the major legal challenges concerning school vouchers. One of these
major challenges is that government subsidization of education that al-
lows government funding to be spent at sectarian schools amounts to im-
permissible establishment of religion. 196 The Supreme Court has clearly
stated that school voucher programs, which leave the ultimate decision of
where to spend such subsidies to the parent, comply with the Unites
States Constitution.' 97
The concept of school vouchers and parental choice also furthers the
well-entrenched fundamental right of parental autonomy, which is the pa-
rental right to control the raising and upbringing of their children.' 98 Al-
194. See generally Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education (Robert A.
Solo ed., Rutgers University Press 1955), available at http://www.freepublic.com/focus/f-
news/1173402/posts.
195. See generally TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PUB-
LIC 214 tbl.7-3, (Brookings Institution Press 2001).
196. See generally Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (holding that the State of Ohio's Pilot Project
Scholarship Program did not violate the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution).
197. See generally id.
198. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (illustrating that the fundamental right to control the
raising of one's children is entrenched in American jurisprudence); see also Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (stating that the Due Process Clause protects the
right of parents to control the upbringing and education of their children); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing "the fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child[ren]"); Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (describing the Supreme Court's consistency in applying the estab-
lished concept that parents have control over their children's upbringing); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (recognizing that the parent-child relationship is constitu-
tionally protected); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 (intimating that the "primary role of the parents
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring Ameri-
can tradition"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (announcing that the right of a
parent to control the management of their children carries a presumption that must be
accorded deference); Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (holding that an Oregon state law requiring chil-
dren to attend public schools was an unconstitutional violation of a parent's right to make
decisions concerning the upbringing of their children); Meyer, 262 U.S. 390 (holding that
Nebraska law which prohibited teaching in any language other than English was an uncon-
stitutional violation of a parent's right to make decisions concerning the upbringing of their
children).
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lowing parents to have control over one of the most important aspects of
their children's lives comports with the sanctity of the fundamental right
of parental autonomy. Furthering such personal choice also reinforces
what has been the focus of many of the foundations of our society. This is
the concept of personal choice. Personal choice drives our economic
thinking. Capitalism is built upon free choice of the individual and busi-
nesses. Personal choice is a cornerstone of the United States Constitu-
tion and the ideas which that historic document embodies. 199
Accordingly, the concept of personal choice is found throughout the juris-
prudence of this nation.2"' The idea of parental choice is not a foreign
concept to the ideas and doctrines upon which this country was founded,
and through which this country has flourished.
Besides the legal and historical reasons justifying the use of parental
choice and school vouchers, there are significant social and empirical rea-
sons that justify their use. Due to the demographics in Texas and the
demographics in the public schools, parental choice would assuredly ben-
efit those who need it most, namely the vast population of economically
disadvantaged students. Along those same lines, parental choice would
benefit many of the minority groups found in Texas. Lastly, studies have
shown that parental school choice leads to more diversity in participating
schools. The benefits of diversity in education are innumerable and are
crucial to society. The Supreme Court expressed this in Grutter v.
Bollinger:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All
members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the
199. See generally, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall
be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States
..... ); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (protecting existing contract rights from government
interference); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (concerning the election of the President); U.S.
CONST. art. V (describing the utilization of a popular vote to amend the Constitution); U.S.
CONST. amend. I (granting religious and political freedom to the people); U.S. CONST.
amend. V (affording the people due process of law); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (granting
right to vote to all citizens); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (detailing process of electing
Senators).
200. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 588 (stipulating that "our laws and tradition
afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to MARRIAGE, PROCREA-
TION, CONTRACEPION, family relationships, CHILD REARING, and education"); Boy Scouts
of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (reaffirming an individual's "right to [choose to] ASSO-
CIATE with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
RELIGIOUS, and cultural" reasons); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (illustrating that the fundamental
right to control the raising of one's children is entrenched in American jurisprudence).
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openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide
this training. 1
Parental choice furthers this important notion of diversity in education.
Because of the inability of the Texas legislature to compose a constitu-
tional, adequate, and efficient public education funding system, nearly a
generation of Texas children has suffered. The impact of an underedu-
cated public is astounding.2 °2 In Texas, nearly 50,000 students drop out of
public school every year.20 3 These dropouts cost the State of Texas an
estimated "$11.4 billion in lost gross state product (GSP). '2 4 Again, the
numbers add up. It obviously would cost Texas less to educate their chil-
dren than to lose out on the increased productivity and the social costs of
supporting a less-educated society. It is imperative that the state become
proactive and attempt to remedy this bleak future. Parental choice and
school vouchers would provide the educational choice and opportunities
that parents, as well as society, should desire for our children. A parental
choice program could be implemented slowly and incrementally in order
to test the system. The legislature should be willing to give parental
choice a try. Texas has attempted various methods of providing educa-
tion, so it is not farfetched for the state to consider school vouchers.
Proper parental choice is not aimed at destroying the public education
system, rather it is should work in tandem with the existing public educa-
tion system. This important and useful tool is available and all we need is
organized support by parents, students and politicians. The fate of our-
selves and our children will be affected by the decisions made with re-
gards to the future of public education in the State of Texas. Possibly that
decision will include parental choice or school vouchers.
201. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332 (describing the importance of diversity in education).
202. See generally Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, The Cost of Underpaying
Texas Teachers (2004), http://www.cpa.state.tx.us/specialrpt/teachersalary04/ (detailing the
impact of dropouts upon the future of the Texas economy).
203. Id.
204. Id.
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